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JURISDICTION1
This is an appeal from the grant of the trial court (Honorable Robert K. Hilder of
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah) of two
summary judgment motions on December 7, 2005 (R. 908-13) ("2005 Order") (attached
hereto as Addendum A), and November 29, 2006 (R. 1440-49) ("2006 Order") (attached
hereto as Addendum B), thereby dismissing Plaintiff/Appellant E&M Sales West Inc. dba
Heatsource's ("Heatsource") Complaint and Second Amended Complaint respectively
against Defendant/Appellee Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC ("BJC"), and
Defendant/Appellee Diversified Metal Products, Inc. ("DMP"). Diversified Control
Systems ("DCS"), a cross-claimant against Heatsource, is not a party to this appeal. This
Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, [the appellate court] gives no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the issues presented under a
correctness standard." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007
UT 72, ^[8, 167 P.3d 1080. Importantly, "[fjactual disputes are viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no statutes,
constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative.
1

BJC specially appears through counsel in this matter and without waiving its rights,
pursuant to the trial court's ruling on a Motion to Dismiss, to challenge the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over BJC by Utah courts after discovery or at trial.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding, and Disposition Below
This case relates to a fixed-price contract between BJC and DMP pursuant to
which BJC paid DMP $716,798 for producing a heater probe system to be used in BJC's
environmental cleanup project in Tennessee for the United States government. (R. 333).
BJC issued a request for proposal for this fixed price contract, DMP submitted a bid for
the work, BJC accepted DMP's bid, and BJC entered into a contract with DMP for the
work. (Id.) After BJC and DMP entered into the contract, BJC provided DMP with a
Specification (the "Spec") for the work. (R. 333-34).
Once DMP had the Spec, DMP subcontracted with Diversified Control Systems
("DCS") to produce a five-zone heater to be inserted into the heater probe system. (R.
334). DCS then sought out and subcontracted with Heatsource in September 2000, to
produce the five-zone heater that would be inserted into the heater probe system. (R.
335). Heatsource produced a five zone heater, and along with DCS and DMP, presented
the contracted for work to BJC in August 2001. (R. 337-38). Then, through DMP,
Heatsource, DCS and DMP submitted a request for equitable adjustment to BJC seeking
increased payments from BJC. (Id.) BJC paid DMP $716,798 pursuant to the Contract
for the production of the entire probe system and related work. (Id.) BJC rejected the
request for equitable adjustment from DMP, DCS, and Heatsource because it was a fixed
price contract and the BJC Spec never changed. (Id.)
Heatsource filed its Complaint against BJC on March 1, 2002 alleging four causes
of action for quantum meruit, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
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unjust enrichment, and fraud. (R. 1-5). In response to Heatsource's Complaint, BJC
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue on April
23, 2002. (R. 33-59). Although the trial court denied BJC's motion to dismiss, it did so
without prejudice, and stated that "[i]f so advised, Defendant may raise the issue of
jurisdiction at or prior to the trial of this action through a Rule 56 Motion or evidentiary
hearing." (R. 96-100). Inasmuch as BJC has no contract with Heatsource, BJC filed a
third-party complaint against DMP on October 16, 2003, claiming breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, indemnity, and requesting
declaratory relief. (R. 162-73). DMP and DCS later cross-claimed against Heatsource
for breach of contract and quantum meruit. (R. 238-44, 246-49).
BJC filed its first motion for summary judgment on August 12, 2005. (R. 326537). Heatsource failed to comply with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
failed to controvert any of the evidence submitted by BJC, and submitted an affidavit that
the trial court struck based on evidentiary shortcomings. Therefore, the trial court found
that there were no genuine issues of material fact and accepted as undisputed all of the
material facts set forth in BJC's memorandum. (R. 908-913, 1442-43).
After viewing these undisputed facts in the light most favorable to Heatsource, the
trial court dismissed Heatsource's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims, finding
that they are identical, equitable in nature, and can only be brought in the absence of an
express contract covering the subject matter of the underlying work performed. (R. 90910). Since the undisputed facts reveal that there was an express contract between BJC
and DMP, and subcontracts between DMP and DCS, and DCS and Heatsource, the trial
3

court found that the work performed by Heatsource "related to the production of the fivezone heaters [which] was subject to, and within the scope of, the express contracts and
subcontracts involved" and therefore Heatsource's claims were barred. (R. 910).
Regarding Heatsource's breach of covenant claim, the trial court found that the
pleadings and the undisputed facts reveal that Heatsource did not plead "and does not
have, a direct contract, either express or implied with BJC." (R. 911). Since there is no
direct contract between Heatsource and BJC, the trial court found that there is no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and dismissed the claim. (Id.) On the fraud
claim, the trial court found that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Heatsource could
not "establish the requisite elements of a claim for fraud." (R. 910). Specifically, the
trial court dismissed the claim because Heatsource could not establish a false statement
by BJC regarding presently existing facts, that a BJC representative knowingly made a
false statement, and because Heatsource could not show detrimental reliance. (Id.)
The trial court, therefore, granted BJC's first motion for summary judgment,
dismissing with prejudice Heatsource's claims for quantum meruit, unjust enrichment,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and fraud. (R. 909-911).
The trial court granted limited leave to Heatsource to file a Second Amended Complaint
to assert a direct contract implied in fact claim against BJC and an implied covenant
claim if the implied covenant claim asserted a breach beyond alleged nonpayment by
BJC. (R. 911-12). The trial court did not grant leave to allege other claims. (Id.)

2

The trial court later explained that "the Order allowing amendment was an abundance of
caution, because BJC had argued persuasively that plaintiff may not assert equitable
4

Heatsource filed its Second Amended Complaint on December 9, 2005, alleging
breach of an implied contract in fact and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. (R. 914-20). BJC filed a second motion for summary judgment on October 27,
2006. (R. 1059-1288). After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted
BJC's motion for summary judgment. With respect to the implied in fact contract claim,
the trial court held that "both contract implied in law and contract implied in fact theories
are barred if enforceable contracts exist covering the same subject matter." (R. 14401449). The trial court also found that there is no evidence or course of conduct to
establish that there was a contract implied in fact between Heatsource and BJC. (Id.)
Without the existence of any express or implied in fact contract between Heatsource and
BJC, there was no implied covenant and Heatsource's breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing failed as well. (Id.) Heatsource now appeals portions of both
of the trial court's rulings on BJC's two motions for summary judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Introduction
In a clear and concise manner, Heatsource should have presented the facts, and
disputes of fact, if any, that the trial court considered in making its decisions on both
motions for summary judgment in order to give this Court the information it needs to
understand the underlying issues. Although not required to formally marshal the
evidence on an appeal from a motion for summary judgment, this case requires a similar
claims under the general rubric of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, if the subject
matter of the claim is covered by a contract or set of contracts." (R. 1442).
5

exercise because most of the facts considered by the trial court on BJC's motions for
summary judgment were not controverted by Heatsource or were deemed admitted.3
Importantly, Heatsource is not appealing the trial court's ruling that Heatsource
failed to controvert the facts, even though such ruling was made in both the 2005 and
2006 Orders, and Heatsource has not argued in its Brief that this ruling was incorrect.
Because Heatsource has not appealed the trial court's decision to deem BJC's facts
admitted, Heatsource has not only waived its right to appeal that aspect of the trial court's
orders, but has accepted those facts as true and undisputed. Similarly, the trial court ruled
that the Affidavit of Andrew Nelson should be stricken based on evidentiary
shortcomings. Heatsource has not appealed this discretionary ruling of the trial court, has
failed to argue in its Brief that the ruling was incorrect, and therefore, has waived any
challenge to that ruling.
This is significant because on summary judgment this Court resolves all
reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. In this instance, most of the facts have been deemed undisputed by the trial court
and/or accepted by Heatsource. Based on those facts alone, this Court can and should
affirm the trial court's decisions on both motions for summary judgment because no
genuine issue of material fact exists. Despite its failure to appeal these rulings of the trial
court, Heatsource has simply forged ahead, ignored the rulings, and presented evidence to
3

The facts contained in paragraphs 1-21 and 33 herein were deemed admitted by the trial
court in its 2005 Order. (R. 908-13), Addendum A. The facts contained in paragraphs 22
through 31 were found to be undisputed by the trial court. (R. 1445-48), Addendum B.
Heatsource has admitted the facts contained in paragraph 32. (R. 1308).
6

this Court that was disregarded and stricken below, was not properly presented as
evidence below, or that was not presented at all to the trial court. This is improper and all
such evidence, and arguments based on this evidence, should be stricken.4
Since Heatsource has failed to appeal these evidentiary rulings, and the rulings
were correct and within the trial court's discretion, the following facts are undisputed:
1.

B JC is performing the role of Management and Integration Contractor for

Environmental Management for the United States Department of Energy. In performing
this work, BJC was to perform environmental cleanup of the Molten Salt Reactor
Experiment located near Oak Ridge, Tennessee. (R. 333, 1065-64).
2.

As part of the cleanup process, BJC issued a Request for Proposal to design

and build the MSRE Salt Melting and Processing Probe System (the "System") The
scope of the contract to be awarded included design, fabrication, testing and certification,
including operation and maintenance manuals for the System. (R. 333, 1066).
3.

DMP made a successful bid proposal to produce the System and was,

therefore, issued a purchase order contract. (R. 334, 1066).
4.

On May 29, 2000, DMP and BJC signed a purchase order contract pursuant

to which DMP was obligated to produce the System, which included producing a heater
probe. (R. 334, 1066).
5.

The contract between BJC and DMP was a fixed price purchase order and

the procurement package/specification was performance based. The cost of building the
System and all of the equipment and components as required by the Spec, was within the
4

BJC has filed a Motion to Strike on these issues concurrently herewith.
7

scope of the contract and subsequent subcontracts between DMP and DCS, and then
eventually DCS and Heatsource. (R. 334, 1066-67).
6.

DMP subcontracted with DCS, and under that subcontract, DCS agreed to

produce the heaters that were part of the System. DCS then sought out Heatsource which
represented that it had expertise in preparing heater probes. In September 2000, DCS
subcontracted with Heatsource, through a purchase order, for Heatsource to produce a
five-zone heater as part of the System. (R. 335, 1067).
7.

Under its subcontract with DCS, Heatsource was required to produce the

heaters for the System and the testing of the heaters was included in the subcontract
between DCS and Heatsource. In fact, Andrew Nelson, the owner of Heatsource,
testified as follows:
Q. Did you understand at that time that the work you were
performing was part of a larger obligation of DCS to DMP
and DMP to Bechtel Jacobs?
A. Yes.
(R.335, 1067-68).
8.

The probe that Heatsource was to produce was described in section 2.5.2.4

of the original Spec, issued by BJC to DMP. Heatsource admits that it received and knew
all of the Specs, contained in section 2.5.2.4 except one related to a testing temperature.
(R. 335-36, 1068, 1446).
9.

BJC's Spec, for the heat probe system never changed during the entire

process. In fact, Nelson testified that he had reviewed the Spec, a few times in 2001 and
explained:
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Q. Did you ever see that [Specification itself change? The
words [on] those pages, those provisions, did those change at
any time between the glimpses that you had?
A. No, they didn't change.
(R.336, 1068,1400).
10.

Neither DMP, nor any of its subcontractors, including Heatsource, ever

asked for a change or modification to the Spec, despite the fact that Heatsource was told
of these channels, the parties knew that requests for modifications could be made, and
that there were multiple other modifications requested and approved throughout the
process. (R. 336, 1068).
11.

The work performed by Heatsource, including the new "solution" or "U-

bent" technology, was part of Heatsource's obligation under its subcontract with DCS.
(R. 1446). Heatsource admitted that the description of its work in its subcontract with
DCS equally describes the "U-bent" heater and the non-U-bent heater. (R. 336, 1068).
12.

Prior to the request for equitable adjustment, Heatsource never said that it

would require extra compensation, that it would bill on a time and materials basis for the
U-bent technology, or that the work would cost more. (R. 336-37, 1068-69, 1446).
13.

The first time that Heatsource asked for additional money for its work was

when it submitted the request for equitable adjustment to BJC through DMP as the party
who had the direct contract with BJC. (R. 337, 1069).
14.

BJC contracted with DMP to get a probe, and a probe is what was produced

by DMP, DCS, and Heatsource. BJC accepted the System on August 9, 2001, and paid

9

DMP $716,798 pursuant to the Contract for the production of the entire probe System
and related work. (R. 337, 1069).
15.

Heatsource did not have a direct contract with either DMP or BJC. (R. 337,

16.

Heatsource did not make a direct demand on BJC for payment, and instead,

1069).

Heatsource invoiced DMP for its work "performed during this period . . . for the Second
Generation probe heaters for the Oak Ridge MSRE project." (R. 337, 1069).
17.

When Heatsource and DCS, through DMP, sought an equitable adjustment

to the Contract price, BJC properly and in good faith considered the request. BJC
rejected the request for equitable adjustment, however, because there was no change in
the Spec, to justify additional amounts. (R. 338, 1069).
18.

While DMP may not have liked the decision, DMP knew that it was within

BJC's rights to deny the request for equitable adjustment, and the grounds for denial were
sound. Herb Pollard of DMP testified that he believed BJC did not act improperly. (R.
338, 1070).
19.

Heatsource bases its fraud, contract implied in fact, and covenant claims on

three statements it claims were made by BJC representatives Rick Dearholt and Rob
Szozda at a June 27, 2001 meeting. The three purported statements were to the effect that
the project had "become a research and development project," that if Heatsource does this
work then BJC would "take care o f Heatsource, and that if Heatsource "do[es] this
work, the money truck will be backing up to the building." These statements were

10

purportedly made at the meeting at DMP on June 27, 2001, and not at any time before or
after that date. (R. 338, 1070).
20.

Nelson believes that Dearholt actually believed the purported statements

attributed to him at the time he allegedly made those statements. And no one from BJC
ever said that they did not intend to pay under the contract. (R. 339, 1073).
21.

Heatsource began the alleged extra work it claims was the subject of the

implied in fact contract in May 2001, prior to the purported statements made by BJC.
Nelson testified that he began work on the "second generation" or "U-bent" technology
in May 2001, without any promise from BJC of being paid for such work. (R. 339,
1445). Specifically, Nelson testified:
Q. And so at that time, you undertook work that you believe
was beyond the scope of your contract with DCS?
A. Yes.
Q. Without any promise of being paid for that work?
A. Without a promise, I would say yes.

Q. He never promised you that you would be compensated
for your work at that time, did he, Jim Hylton?
A. No, he made no specific promise.
Q. So between May 14th and June 27th, you continued to
work on heat probes without any specific promise from
Bechtel Jacobs that you would get paid for that work?
Q. Yeah, I didn't have a specific promise.
(R. 340, 1070-71).
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22.

The June 27, 2001 meeting was a status meeting on the progress that DMP

and its subcontractors (DCS and Heatsource) were making on producing the heater probe
system related to the contract between BJC and DMP. In fact, BJC was concerned that
DMP was behind schedule and wanted to know the status and estimated date of
completion. (R. 1071).
23.

Dearholt made clear at the meeting that this work related to a fixed-price

contract, that the Spec, and heat requirement had not changed, and unless anyone present
could show a substantial change to the Spec, BJC expected that DMP and its
subcontractors would produce the required heater probe system as contracted for between
BJC and DMP. (R. 1071).
24.

Dearholt explained to those present at the meeting that BJC did not have a

preference regarding what process or technology was used, it just needed DMP and its
subcontractors to produce the heater probe system pursuant to the Spec, and according to
the contract between BJC and DMP. (R. 1071).
25.

At the meeting, Dearholt told Nelson that BJC did not have a contract with

Heatsource, but that Heatsource's deal was with DMP or DCS, and if Heatsource wanted
a new contract, it would have to look to DMP or DCS. (R. 1072).
26.

At the meeting Dearholt stated to all those present that this project uwas not

going to become a research and development project." (R. 1072).
27.

Heatsource has admitted that there was no discussion with BJC about time

and materials payment on June 27, 2001. (R. 1446).
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28.

At the meeting, Dearholt told Nelson that BJC was not going to back the

money truck up to make DMP or its subcontractors rich. (R. 1072).
29.

BJC did not have a meeting of the minds with Heatsource, did not agree to

any contractual terms related to the heater probe system, did not agree to different terms
from the DMP contract related to price, costs of labor, costs of materials, quantity, who
was to direct the work, how the work was to be performed, where the work would be
performed, or how Heatsource would be paid. BJC did not, therefore, enter into a
contract with Heatsource. (R. 1072).
30.

Heatsource alleged and admitted that its purported contract with BJC

continued to change in terms even after the June 27, 2001 meeting, and without the
participation of BJC itself, the supposed other party to the agreement. Nelson was asked
if the June 27, 2001 contract continued to grow, expand, and change terms throughout the
two months that Heatsource was doing the work. His response was: "[w]ell, I think the
objective of the—yes, I would say that it broadened and solidified." (R. 1072). In
addition, Nelson testified:
Q. Okay. So I guess I'm left wondering, then—a few
minutes ago you mentioned that this contract continued to
change—
A. Sure.
Q. -after June 27th?
A. Right
(R. 1072-73).
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31.

BJC and Heatsource had no discussions regarding when Heatsource would

be paid for the alleged "extra work."
Q. You discussed that term when you would be paid with a
Bechtel Jacobs representative?
A. No.
(R. 1073).
32.

Nelson testified that BJC told him that it believed that Heatsource should be

paid, but that payment should be from Heatsource's contracting party, not from BJC. (R.
339, 1073, 1308).
33.

Heatsource's sole basis for claiming that the statements allegedly made by

Dearholt at the June 27, 2001 meeting were fraudulent is that Heatsource did not get paid
what it later demanded. Heatsource provided no other facts to support its fraud claim.
Q. Do you or do you not have any other facts that support
this allegation other than what you've said which you believe
is not being paid?
A. No, I'm basing this on not being paid.
(R. 339).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not err when it granted BJC's two motions for summary
judgment based on the undisputed facts that were never controverted by Heatsource.
Even now, in its appeal to this Court, Heatsource relies on the stricken affidavit of
Andrew Nelson (the 'Nelson Affidavit") and facts raised for the first time on appeal.
Importantly, Heatsource makes no mention of the facts that were deemed admitted below,
and in fact, does not even cite to the record in many instances. Most problematic is that
14

Heatsource has not identified any instances of error on the part of the trial court.
Moreover, Heatsource has not identified any genuine issues of material fact that the trial
court failed to recognize or give proper credence to.
Instead of committing errors, the trial court correctly ruled on each issue below.
With respect to the undisputed facts, the trial court correctly found that the facts were
deemed admitted because Heatsource had failed, both times, to controvert the facts set
forth by BJC. This was well within the trial court's discretion. Similarly, the trial court
appropriately ordered stricken the Nelson Affidavit for various reasons, including that it
was contradictory to his own prior deposition testimony, it was conclusory, self-serving,
and speculative. This again, was a proper decision of the lower court. Significantly,
Heatsource has not appealed these decisions and without challenging them in its Brief,
has waived its opportunity to challenge them. As a result, the undisputed facts as
accepted by the trial court should also be all deemed admitted and undisputed on appeal.
With respect to the underlying claims raised in this appeal, the trial court's rulings
were correct. In its Complaint, Heatsource alleged claims for unjust enrichment, breach
of implied covenant, quantum meruit, and for fraud. BJC's motion focused on each of
these claims. Specifically, the trial court found that Heatsource's unjust enrichment and
quantum meruit claims "are identical and are equitable in nature, such that they may only
be brought in the absence of an express contract over the subject matter of the underlying
work performed." (R. 909). This ruling is supported by the undisputed facts which
establish that BJC contracted with DMP, DMP subcontracted with DCS, and then DCS
subcontracted the heater portion with Heatsource. These contracts and subcontracts
15

related precisely to the work to be performed by Heatsource and therefore any unjust
enrichment or quantum meruit claims are barred as a matter of law.
As to the fraud claim, the trial court properly found that no genuine issue of
material fact existed and that as a matter of law, BJC was entitled to summary judgment.
The trial court found that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Heatsource could not
establish the requisite elements of a fraud claim because Heatsource could not show: (1) a
false statement concerning a presently existing fact; (2) that a BJC representative knew
such statement to be false; and (3) that Heatsource detrimentally relied on any allegedly
false statement by BJC. The trial court was correct, the decision is supported by the
undisputed facts, and Heatsource has not shown any error in this regard.
With respect to Heatsource's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing claim, the trial court correctly found that it fails as a matter of law. Such an
implied covenant is only imposed in express contracts between parties. The trial court
found that there was no direct contract between BJC into which an implied covenant
could be imposed. The undisputed facts strongly support this determination, as does the
fact that BJC never pled a breach of contract claim. Moreover, the trial court
appropriately held that even if an implied covenant existed, BJC had acted fairly and in
good faith. The undisputed facts fully support this ruling.
Out of an abundance of caution, the trial court allowed Heatsource to amend its
complaint to assert a claim for breach of implied in fact contract. In the Second
Amended Complaint, Heatsource alleged a claim for breach of implied in fact contract
and again asserted a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.
16

In response, BJC filed its second motion for summary judgment. In that context, the trial
court again made similar evidentiary rulings related to Heatsource's failure to controvert
the facts and the previous striking of the Nelson Affidavit. These rulings were supported
by the law and were well within the trial court's purview.
As to the implied in fact claim, the trial court found that Heatsource could not
establish the requisite elements of such a claim, especially in light of the parties' conduct
that indicated there was no direct contract between BJC and Heatsource. The undisputed
facts clearly support this finding and show that there was no meeting of the minds, no
essential terms for a contract, and no conduct to suggest a direct contract between
Heatsource and BJC. Thus, the grant of summary judgment on the claim is appropriate.
Significantly, Heatsource has not appealed the dismissal of the implied in fact contract
claim, has not listed this as an issue for appeal, and has not briefed the issue.
Consequently, this ruling is not before the Court. With respect to the breach of implied
covenant claim, the trial court appropriately found again that in the absence of an express
contract or implied in fact contract, there could be no covenant claim. This ruling is also
supported by the law and undisputed facts.
In short, the trial court was very careful and cautious in making the various rulings
granting summary judgment to BJC. The trial court was prepared at each hearing, had
astutely reviewed the briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, and meticulously
considered the issues in rendering its decisions—drafting a well-reasoned opinion on the
second summary judgment motion. The trial court was a model of appropriate judicial
process, understood the applicable law, and correctly applied that law to the undisputed
17

facts. Nothing in Heatsource's Brief sufficiently finds fault with the actions of the trial
court or establishes any reversible error. Consequently, this Court should uphold the
decisions of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT NO GENUINE
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AND DEEMED BJC'S
FACTS UNDISPUTED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.

The Trial Court Correctly Found that BJC's Facts Were Undisputed,
and Deemed the Facts Admitted, Because Heatsource Failed to
Properly Controvert BJC's Facts.

The trial court properly deemed all of BJC's facts undisputed because Heatsource
failed to controvert the facts set forth in BJC's motions. "[A] trial court may exercise its
discretion to require compliance with the Rules of Judicial Administration, particularly
rule 4-501, without impairing a party's substantive rights." Fennell II v. Green, 2003 UT
App 291, ^j 9, 77 P.3d 339. The Fennell court properly deemed all facts admitted in that
case because the party opposing the motion failed to controvert the facts. Id As the
Supreme Court explained in Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist., 2002 UT 130, f 50, 63
P.3d 705, u[u]nder Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, all
facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.'"
(citation omitted).
With respect to BJC's first motion for summary judgment, the trial court held:
Based on Heatsource's failure to comply with the
requirements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7, as well
as Heatsource's failure to controvert the evidence submitted
by BJC to support its undisputed material facts, the Court
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finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
accepts as undisputed, the material facts set forth by BJC in
its moving papers.
2005 Order, Addendum A at p. 1. Similarly, in its 2006 Order on BJC's second motion
for suniinaiN iiidgment, tin 111 iIII

II I I

As a necessary part of my earlier ruling, I accepted BJC's
position that plaintiff had utterly failed to comply with Rule
7(c)(3)(B), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as plaintiff
did not specifically identify and restate BJC's statement of
undisputed facts, and even where plaintiff claimed factual
disputes, in virtually every instance those statements were not
supported by citations to the record.
2006 Order, Addendum B at pp. 3-4.
Significantly, Heatsource is not appealing the tiial couil s decision to deem
admitted all of BJC's facts for Heatsource's failure to controvert. Indeed, Heatsource
makes no mention of the trial court's decision to deem admitted all tit these facts in either
its Docketing Statement or in its Brief to this Court. Therefore, any potential challenge to
this decision has been waived and the Court need not consider it. See Brown v. Glover,
20il 1 1 89,1[2:> lh I

i vl<) (gnieullv issues not presentt cl in the opening brief are

considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court)(citations omitted);
State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, If 4 n. 2, 993 P.2d 894 (it is inappropriate to raise
issues il ouil n

i in lint "have n< »1 liu n il % i^n ited as issues on tf f ill in lln*

docketing statement or in the briefs.").
Even if Heatsource had appealed the above decisions, the trial court was well
within I diii i In i h illtvinllN

lul nihil pulul h III I

lire's failure to controvert

those facts. See Fennell II at 1f 9; see also Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, fflf
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8, 11, 156 P.3d 175 ("Defendants' opposing memorandum . . . did not include a coherent
explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required by rule 7(c)(3)(B). . . . Thus, we
are unpersuaded that Defendants substantially complied with rule 7(c)(3)(B), and we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment based on Defendants' noncompliance with rule
7(c)(3)(B).").
Likewise, in this case, Heatsource did not even attempt to comply with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and this disregard for the rules made it nearly impossible for
B JC and the trial court to decipher what facts, if any, Heatsource disputed. Moreover,
Heatsource did not merely fail once to properly controvert the facts submitted by BJC,
but it failed twice, as it failed to properly controvert the facts submitted by BJC to
support its second motion for summary judgment as well. This second failure is
inexcusable after having the rules highlighted by BJC in its reply in support of its first
motion for summary judgment, as well as having the trial court expressly rule as it did on
the first motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the facts set forth in this Brief
must be accepted as undisputed as the trial court properly deemed the facts admitted by
Heatsource based on its repeated failures to controvert the evidence. These facts, when
considered and applied to the appropriate law (discussed below), demonstrate that the
trial court properly granted BJC's motions for summary judgment because no genuine
issue of material fact existed.
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B.

The Nelson Affidavit Was Appropriately Stricken by the Trial Coiirt,
and is Improperly Cited in Heatsource's Brief to This C o u r t

Heatsource has disregarded the trial court's appropriate decision to strike the
Nelson Affidavit, attached as Addendum 3 to Brief of Appellant. Rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that evidence and affidavits :oi isic lei ed for si in tt t mi y
judgment "be made on personal knowledge" and "set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence" and implicitly requires that affidavits not be conclusory in form
or contaii 1 \ n i,si lbstai itiatec 1 o{ >inioi is oi 1 >eliefs. See Gaw v. Utah P e p t of Iransp.,' 798
P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Regarding the Nelson Affidavit, the trial court
held:
BJC properly asked the Court to disregard that Affidavit,
because it came subsequent to Mr. Nelson's voluminous
deposition, and it was inconsistent with or contradicted
deposition testimony. I am not sure that I expressly ruled that
the Affidavit should be stricken, but it was inherent in my
prior ruling that plaintiff had failed to adequately rebut at
least the first 28 claimed undisputed facts asserted by BJC
and at this time I make clear that the Nelson Affidavit
submitted in 2005 should be stricken.
2006 Oi i let , \d( Hi :M a it it i i B i t.1 p 1
This decision w a s well within the discretion o f the trial court because the Nelson
Affidavit is satiated with evidentiary problems and inadmissible statements, a n d it
tradicts Nelsi

.ony. (R. 631-3 Il ) ' I "1 le 1 rii tl CM :)i u t

properly struck the Nelson Affidavit for many reasons, not the least of which was the
contradictory testimony offered in the affidavit after his deposition. See Webster v. Sill
67::

;

i 1V83) (stating tl lat " vvhen a |; >ai !b • takes a cleai positioi i if I a
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deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition"). As a result, the trial
court's decision was correct and supported by the evidence.
Heatsource has failed to properly challenge the trial court's ruling to strike the
Nelson Affidavit. Heatsource makes no mention of the trial court's decision to strike the
Nelson Affidavit in either its Docketing Statement or in its Brief to this Court. As such,
any potential challenge to this decision has been waived and the Court need not consider
it.5 Because the Nelson Affidavit was properly stricken by the trial court and Heatsource
is not appealing that decision, all references to it in Heatsource's Brief should be
disregarded and stricken by this Court. Also, the "Test Results" submitted by Heatsource
as Addendum 2 and Addendum 4 to its Brief should be stricken from the record because
these "Test Results" were only before the trial court as exhibits to the Nelson Affidavit.
Since the evidence in Addenda 2 and 4 was stricken from the record by the trial court, it
should be disregarded and stricken by this Court as well. In addition, the following
arguments and statements in Heatsource's Brief should be stricken and disregarded by
this Court because they are based on the above, improper evidence:

5

•

Page 8, numbered paragraph 6;

•

Pages 8-9, numbered paragraphs 9 and 10; and

•

Page 23, all portions of first full paragraph related to the Nelson Affidavit.6

See Brown, at f 23; Arviso, at ^J 4 n. 2.

6

This is not an exhaustive list of all statements in Heatsource's Brief that are improperly
based on the Nelson Affidavit. Indeed, most of the factual assertions in Heatsource's
Brief are based on the Nelson Affidavit, even though not attributed as such, and should
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C,

All Evidence and Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal by
Heatsource Must Be Stricken and Not Considered by the C o u r t

Heatsource raises new facts and issues in its Brief and Addendum that were never
presented to or considered by the trial court during the summary judgment briefing and
r

I •- *

hese fa<

.H. ...• herefore, i lot): >t : pei ly before tl le Coi u t

and they must be stricken and disregarded by the Court on appeal. See Lovendahl ^ 5152 ("[t]his court will not consider evidence not made part of the record on appeal.") It is
ft u idai i lei italb ' i in lfaii t : • litigants, as well as to the ti ial : :>i n t to :oi isidei ev idei ice at id
arguments on appeal that were not submitted to or considered by the trial court and the
parties below. The following evidence is raised for the first time on appeal by
Heatsource an
•

Addendum 3, an affidavit of Andrew Nelson submitted in opposition to

BJC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This affidavit was not
submitted to or considered by the trial cour t at the summary judgment stage;
•

Addendum 7, portions of the deposition transcript of Andrew Nelson.

Except for transcript page 19, none of these deposition transcript pages were
submitted to or considered by the trial court;
•
coi-

Addendum 8, the deposition transcript of Daniel Schwender. Neither the
his depositioi i , i tot the c leposition transcript itself, were :•*, *

considered by the trial court;

be disregarded. This list only addresses the portions that Heatsource actually cited as
emanating from the Nelson Affidavit.
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i to or

•

Addendum 9, an affidavit of John Richard Dearholt submitted in support of

BJC's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. This affidavit was not
submitted to or considered by the trial court at the summary judgment stage;
•

Addendum 10, a purported expert report by a Dr. Noel de Nevers. Neither

the content of this report, nor the report itself, were submitted to or considered by
the trial court; and
•

Addendum 13, various non-authenticated emails, the content of which, nor

the emails themselves, were submitted to or considered by the trial court.
Because the above evidence is not properly before the court, a significant portion
of Heatsource's Brief should also be disregarded and stricken because the arguments are
based on this improper evidence. Specifically, the following arguments and statements in
Heatsource's Brief should be stricken and disregarded by this Court:
•

Page 4, first paragraph, first two sentences;

•

Pages 11 -12, all portions of numbered paragraph 17 that refer or relate to

any deposition testimony of Nelson (except for deposition transcript page 19);
•

Pages 12-13, numbered paragraphs 20-22;

•

Pages 13-14, all portions of numbered paragraph 23 below the line on page

13 as they refer to the deposition of Schwender;
•

Pages 16-17, entire block quote from deposition of Nelson;

•

Page 23, all portions of the first two full paragraphs that relate to deposition

testimony of Schwender or Nelson;
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•

Page 24, entire page as the statements are exclusively derived from

• * ddend; t ( ); ii ),< 1 1 ;: !, ,

•

Page 25, entire paragraph designated as paragraph " ( 2 ) " related to

A d d e n d u m 13; and
•

Page 27, ei itire paragi apl i be gini ii:t ig \ v itl i ""Ii; i : ;)i iti: ast" tl i,at i elies i ipc i i ai id

sets forth purported deposition testimony from Todd Lindstrom which was not
submitted to or considered by the trial court.
D.

All Facts Not Properly Cited to and Supported by the Rec ci i cl i n
Heatsource's Brief Should be Disregarded by the Court.

Heatsource has utterly failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules o f
i Appellate I :,i ocedi n e ;i >l lie! 11 :x \\ lii e s tl lat '|a]ll statei t ici its of fact ai id i eferences to tl lie
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record . . . . UTAH R. A P P .
PROC. 24(a)(7). A thorough review of Heatsource's Statement of Fact reveals very few
citations t : • tl le i: ecoi :!! ' I I lose facts tl lat at e pi e: ;ei ited v 'itl 101 it • :itatioi is t :: tl le it e :oi :1
should not be considered by this Court. See Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d
950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stating that "we only consider those facts properly cited

Here, most of the purported facts in Heatsource's Brief are based on the evidence
that should be stricken Alternatively, miich like the conclusory and unsubstantiated
•

' • !-wit—whi ::! I 'as sti ickei I tl lese pi it poi ted facts are i nei el) '

unsupported conjecture with no factual support in the record. Consequently, the Court
should not consider the following evidence found in the Statement of Fact in
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Heatsource's Brief: Paragraphs 1-2, 5, everything after the first sentence in paragraph 6,
paragraph 8, everything after the first sentence in paragraph 10, paragraphs 11-14,
everything after the first sentence in paragraph 15, and paragraph 23.
The facts set forth in the above paragraphs are not properly cited to or supported
by the record. As a result, this evidence and related arguments should be disregarded and
should not be allowed to create a disputed material fact. The rules of procedure are
designed to prevent a party and its counsel from merely submitting its own thoughts or an
unsubstantiated factual narrative on appeal. Heatsource should be held to the standards
required by the rules and therefore, the above information should be disregarded.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED HEATSOURCE'S
FRAUD CLAIM
The trial court correctly found that no genuine issue of material fact existed with

respect to Heatsource's fraud claim and that as a matter of law, BJC was entitled to
summary judgment. (R 910-11). Specifically, the court found that the undisputed facts
demonstrated that Heatsource could not establish the requisite elements of a fraud claim
because Heatsource could not show a false statement concerning a presently existing fact,
could not show that any BJC representative knew such statement to be false, and because
Heatsource could not show detrimental reliance. (Id.).
BJC agrees with the elements of a fraud claim set forth in Heatsource's Brief (p.
16). However, none of the supposed evidence cited by Heatsource to support the
arguments in its Brief is admissible since it was not submitted to the trial court. (See
Motion to Strike, filed concurrently herewith). Moreover, the undisputed facts actually
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submitted to the trial court demonstrate that Heatsource cannot prevail on a fraud claim.
I Jtah coi irts "have stressed, at id coi itit 11 u :; to 1 iolc 1 tl lat i r lei e coi lclusory allegations in a
pleading, unsupported by recitation of relevant surrounding facts, are insufficient to
preclude . . . summary judgment." Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 2001 1 1 1 2 5 , j | 36, 21 P 3d 198 h id< :< %I,< i < u )i i rf >1; lii it si , i lid b< : c lismiss* :d if tl i< :
plaintiff fails to "'set forth in specific terms the time, place, content, and manner of each
defendant's alleged material misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct.'"
Coroles v. Sabev. 2003 U I App 339, )\ 28 n. 15, 79 P.3d 974 (citation omitted).
Here, Heatsource did not plead its fraud claim with particularity, and failed to
allege any specific representations made by BJ

V1ten they were made, who made them,

how they were false, or how Heatsource detrimentally relied on such representations. (R.
1 5) Even if the claim were pled with sufficient particularity, BJC was entitled to
summary judgment because Heatsource earn lot establisl i tl ie i equisite elen ici its :)f a ft ai i< i
claim. In his deposition testimony, Nelson claimed that the only statements made to him
by BJC were to the effect that: '' x

" Heatsource could produce the required heat probes,

tl lei i it < :)i ild be takei i cai e of ; (2) tl lat tl ie pi p ject 1 lad i i :,) * v bee- :>.n ie a researcl i. ait id
development project; and (3) if the heat probes were completed, BJC would back the
money truck up to the building. (R. 338, 1070). Nelson claims that these statements
were n / • '*
statements were never repeated by BJC either before or at any time thereafter. (Id.)

7

While several people attended the meeting, no one else has testified to hearing these
alleged statements. (R. 338 n 1). Nelson never repeated these purported representations
27

For several reasons, these purported statements and Heatsource's conduct are
insufficient to establish fraud, and Heatsource cannot prove the requisite elements of its
claim. First, under Utah law the "simple failure to pay [under a contract] does not
constitute fraud." DeBrv v. Cascade Enters.. 879 P.2d 1353, 1359 (Utah 1994). Here, as
explained by Nelson in his deposition, Heatsource exclusively bases its fraud claim on
"not being paid" by BJC and has no other facts to support this claim. (R. 339). As a
matter of law, this does not constitute fraud and Heatsource's claim fails.
Second, the evidence shows that BJC did not act fraudulently or make any
intentionally false statements. (R. 338). In fact, Nelson opined that Dearholt believed
that Heatsource should get paid and at the time he purportedly made the above
statements, that Dearholt believed the alleged statements. (R. 339, 1073). Significantly,
in its response to BJC's first motion for summary judgment, Heatsource stated that "[i]t
may therefore be inferred that BJC did intend to pay." (R. 667). This inference, which
was raised and supported by Heatsource, clearly demonstrates that BJC did not act
fraudulently or make any statements without the intent to follow through on those
statements. This fact alone, which again, was presented by Heatsource, clearly defeats
Heatsource's fraud claim because it establishes that Heatsource cannot show the second,
third and fourth elements of its claim—that a representation concerning a presently
existing material fact was false, and the representor either knew it to be false or made it
recklessly without sufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation.
to DMP or DCS, even though they met immediately after the June 27, 2001 meeting to
put together a letter to BJC. (Id.) Nor were the purported comments raised in the request
for equitable adjustment. (Id.)
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Third, the purported statements were not actually false. It is undisputed that BJC
paid 'W lb, 798 HI H In its conli u 1 ID JJMP at I IK >anu' loialion wbnc tin pnrpnifnl
"money truck" would have backed up. (R. 337, 1069). Even i i a tfcmoney truck"
statement was made, certainly paying $ /1 <>, /98 represents a driving of a money truck
lrom BM ' to MMI* Moreover, there is no evidence to show that BJC intended not to pay,
and in fact, Nelson testified that BJC believed that Heatsource should be paid, not by
UK , bul In the party Heatsource contracted with. (K. i W. Ill i|

llius the facts show

that BJC paid a substantial amount of money for this project to DMP believing that the
money would flow downhill to the subcontractors, including Heatsource, such thai
everyone in the process won hi Iv taken careol

V, an li II \itsource cannot shn\s that

the statements were actually false and its fraud claim fails.
Finally, Heatsource cannot show detrimental reliance on the purported
lepieseutations. "One critical i lemnil nl | i li iiui| an

nl H li in is ai dial icliano on a

false representation." DeBry, 879 P.2d at 13i8. A plaintiff must show that 'reliance was
placed on such acts or representations" or there is no injury. Voorhees v. Fisher, 34 P
<vl t\l> (1 lt,ih III" 'I I liiiini In iiiiiill

lit n p i iiiitill \\ 11 m 1 m l l n e i x nil In null III I m i l i Is n n m r

fraudulent representations). Significantly, reliance cannot be shown when the plaintiff
undertakes the conduct—which it later claims it would not have taken—before the time
(In puipurtnli picsetitatioii \wiw i In ill maih

see Allen v. Htzgeraid, in II1 i>92, 594

(Utah 1901) (reliance not shown when improvements placed on land w cic not induced by
any promise or representation). For example, in Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison,
MUM I M I I \ i i

II I1 \\\

11 ii i m i l l i i . i i o l Ih ill flu- p l . i n i l i l l
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null I

I h.ne

detrimentally relied upon a job cost detail report because it was not available to the
plaintiff until long after the plaintiff had taken the actions that constituted its claimed
injury. In other words, the plaintiff had made all payments prior to receiving the job cost
detail report so the plaintiff could not show detrimental reliance because it received the
job cost detail report after it had already undertaken its performance obligation. IdL
Likewise, the trial court here correctly found that Heatsource cannot show
detrimental reliance on any statements by BJC. As noted above, Heatsource was required
to produce the heater probe under its contract with DCS. (R. 335-36, 1067-68). As such,
all of its work that forms the basis of this dispute was required under the terms of its
agreement with DCS, and certainly within the scope of work for which BJC contracted
with DMP. (R. 333-37, 1066-69). Thus, Heatsource undertook this work well before the
June 27, 2001 meeting. (R. 335, 1067). Furthermore, even if Heatsource somehow
claims that there was additional work that it undertook, outside the scope of its contract
with DCS, the fact is that Heatsource undertook that worker/or to the purported
statements made by BJC. (R. 339-40, 1070-71, 1445). Nelson testified that he began the
work on the "second generation" or "u-bent" technology in May 2001 without any
promise of being paid for such work. (R. 339, 1445). Accordingly, Heatsource
undertook the work, that it now claims was fraudulently induced by BJC on June 27,
2001, in May 2001 and well before the June 27, 2001 meeting. Thus, Heatsource cannot
show detrimental reliance on any purported statements made two months after it
undertook work on the so-called uu-bent" technology.
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For the above reasons, the trial court correctly found that "since Heatsource cannot
establish tii. ;- msite elements of a fra/i id claim, and has not created a genuine issue of
material fact or otherwise controverted the evidence submitted by BJC as undisputed,
BJC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law " (R 9 I 0 1 1). Il he trial coi irt
coi il :! i i,c: t be n lore correct , at id this Coi n t should uphold the decision.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED HEATSOURCE'S
UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM(S)8
I 'oh its II ait id III1 ' : f 1 1 sats :>i it ce's Bi ie f both state tl i,e at gi in lei it tl tat the ti ial :oi n It

erred in dismissing the "Unjust Enrichment" claim(s) of Heatsource. BJC cannot
determine any distinction between the arguments in these two sections, and does not
i inderstai id wl i;; tl lei e are two idei itical legal sectioi is Hi i< ieed , tl ic sai i le stai idai d foi a
contract implied in law/unjust enrichment is set forth in both sections (compare pp. 25
and \* -t Heatsource's Briel

,v both sections of Heatsource's : v

discuss alleged

Heatsource has argued in Points II and IV of its Brief that it is entitled to recover
under an implied in law/unjust enrichment theory, claiming that BJC received a benefit,
that BJC acknowledged the benefit, and that it would be unjust for BJC to retain the

As case law explains, "quantum meruit" is the broad umbrella term for quasi contract
claims and has two distinct branches: contracts implied in law and those implied in fact.
Scheller v.Dixie Six Corp.. 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The first branch,
implied in law, is synonymous with a claim for unjust enrichment. Knight v. Post 748
P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Heatsource's Brief, only claim(s) for implied
in law/unjust enrichment are discussed. To avoid confusion, BJC will use the terms
"implied in law" and "unjust enrichment" interchangeably herein, and avoid, where
appropriate, using the term "quantum meruit."
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benefit without paying for it. (Heatsource's Brief, 25, 30-31). The trial court, however,
correctly found that Heatsource's implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) were barred.
It is well settled that an unjust enrichment claim fails when an actual contract
exists that covers the scope of the performance—the same performance that purportedly
gave an unjust benefit to the other party. Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586 P.2d
461, 465 (Utah 1978). The Utah Supreme Court explained in American Towers Owners
Assoc. Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996):
[I]f a legal remedy is available, such as breach of an express
contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of
unjust enrichment. Mann v. American W. Life Ins. Co., 586
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in quasi contract is not
available where there is an express contract covering the
subject matter of the litigation."); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("Recovery under quantum
meruit presupposes that no enforceable written or oral
contract exists.")
Accord UTCO Assocs., Ltd. v. Zimmerman, 2001 UT App 117, ^ 22, 27 P.3d 177
(holding that "plaintiff could not recover under quantum meruit because he had failed to
exhaust his legal remedies" which consisted of contract claims); Wood v. Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35, % 10, 19 P.3d 392 (holding that "recovery under unjust
enrichment theory is available only when 'no enforceable written or oral contract
exists'") (citation omitted); Lvsenko v. Sawava. 1999 UT App 31, If 13, 973 P.2d 445
("'if a legal remedy is available . . . the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment'") (citation omitted). Indeed, "[rjecovery under quantum meruit presupposes
that no enforceable contract exists." Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Gravstone Pines
Homeowners' Assoc, 789 P.2d 52, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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In American Towers, a homeowners association brought suit against contractors
ai id si lbcontractoi s foi i u lyi ist ei 11 icl n i lei it

1 he coi 1111 t explaii led:

In this case, each defendant is party to a construction contract
that addresses the specific subject matter of the Associatioi f s
unjust enrichment claim. The contracting parties were
apparently satisfied with each other's performance because
they each paid the contract price and accepted the work
performed as meeting their contract terms. The Association,
a stranger to these contracts, cannot now demand that
defendants adjust the contract price by complaining that
defendants were unjustly enriched. See Knight v. Post, 748
P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (denying quantum
meruit claim against nonparty to construction contract).
Id.; see also U T C O , fflj 24-26 (noting that contractor must pursue proper contract claims
agaii ist I'lMitnuliii^ paih itul M illt llntHI 11.• • IH, I
In Malonev v. Therm Alum Indus., Corp., 636 So.2d 767, 768-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App 1994), a case cited with approval by this Court in UTCO, supra, the court explained
1:1: mt a si ibcoi iti actoi in n ist pi it si i z"" I lis (lit e ::t i en led;; ' against 1:1 le • :oi iti actoi " i athet thai I
pursue the landowner (who received the benefit and had contracted with the contractor)
because the subcontractor had no contractual relationship w itii the landowner. The
Malonev cowl tuitlri < i \pljiitul dial before stvknu!" ,tn n\\\vA « Murium il ilifi 11 W "iiust
pursue his direct contractual remedy against the contractor. Id.
Here, the above authorities support the trial c o i n I s determination that
Heatsource's claims for "Unjust Enrichment" and " ()i lai ttin i i IV len lit" "ai e idei itical ai id
are equitable in nature, such that they may only be brought in the absence of an express
contract over the subject matter of the underlying work performed.' (R 909)

Fhe trial

coi u t f"i n tl iei sfoi u id that 1:1 le i in< lispi ited facts established tl tat B IC cot iti acted w iti i DMP,
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which then subcontracted with DCS, which later subcontracted with Heatsource, and that
the "work performed by Heatsource related to the production of the five-zone heaters was
subject to, and within the scope of, the express contracts and subcontracts involved." (R.
910; see also, R. 1446, where the trial court explained: "Based on already admitted facts,
the work performed by Heatsource was part of its obligations under its subcontract with
DCS. Heatsource admitted that the work it was required to do under its subcontract with
DCS equally describes work for "U-bent" heaters and non-U-bent heaters.").
Consequently, the trial court properly determined that these claims failed as a matter of
law since the work that formed the basis of these equitable claims was also entirely
covered by and within the scope of the express contracts and subcontracts. Id.9
The trial court's decision is not only an accurate reflection of the law, but is also a
correct application of the law to the undisputed facts in this case. Specifically, the work
performed by Heatsource was covered by and the subject of a set of express subcontracts.
The undisputed facts show that BJC issued an RFP for a fixed price contract and accepted
DMP's bid. (R. 333-34, 1066-67).l0 The contract between BJC and DMP required that
DMP produce a heater probe system pursuant to the Spec. (R. 334, 1066). DMP then
9

Although the implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) were not the subject of the
Second Amended Complaint or the second summary judgment motion, the trial court
confirmed its prior ruling stating: "After carefully reconsidering all of the applicable
case law, I am persuaded that both contract implied in law and contract implied in fact
theories are barred if enforceable contracts exist covering the same subject matter. (See
cases cited in BJC's opening memorandum, which cases address both branches of quasi
contract. .. .)" (R. 1447).
10

When a party makes a bid on a fixed price contract, which is then accepted and
awarded, the bidder generally bears the risk of not being paid overage costs if the actual
costs go above the fixed price. (R. 343 n. 2).
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subcontracted

"

nr

^ a portion of the work to produce a heater probe (R 335 106'7)

DCS ti lei i soi lgl it oi it I leatsoi u ce, v 't ic t epi esei itec 1 tl lat it had expertise it i prepai it ig
heater probes, and subcontracted with Heatsource to have Heatsource produce a heater
probe. (Tcj .

IUS, there can be no dispute related to the cllaiii of contracts: BJC

foiifiMt/tnl Willi I >M1J, who in i• Ji • i "Jiihconlrarlnl with DCS, who in turn subcontracted
with Heatsource. (R. 334-35, 1066-67)

I ikewise, there is no dispute that the work

performed by Heatsource was subject to its subcontract with .

S, was covered by an

express contract, ai id tl lat Heatsource was required to pi oduce the heaters for the System.
(R. 335-36, 1067-68). Even the work on the new "solution" or "U-bent" technology was
part of Heatsource's obligation under its subcontract witl i D( 'S (K. 3 ><» I f l<>*)
Heatsource's self-created uncertainty in the heater temperature, based on its own
conjecture about a moving target on suclI temperatures is immaterial and does not create
a genuine issue of material fiu: I Despite its slalftitnil I tin rnntiaiN iiiiii mis Brief, •
Heatsource has repeatedly admitted that the S p e c , the only document that applied to the
heater probe system being prepared, never changed. (R. 336, 1068, 1400). Section
2.5.2.4 • :»f tt le Spec. 1; las alwa> s stated tl lat tl le """"I: leatei s si lall be capable of si ista.ii led
operation at a temperature of 800°C." (R. 486). Furthermore, while Heatsource now
attempts to create something out of various project documents, Heatsource also claims
tl tat it :li: :1 it lot se :: tl le Spec m intil • iis X F < • "nt ; > in 1 t l lis litigatioi i (1 leatsoi n ce' s Brief, 26)
11

Significantly, in Heatsource's Opposition Memorandum to the first motion for
summary judgment it admitted: "The probe system was sub-contracted out to [DMP]
who in turn sub-contracted out part of the system to [DCS] DCS subcontracted the
probe heaters to the Plaintiff, Heatsource." (R. 656 ).
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While that is not accurate (See R. 1400), it is important to note that Heatsource did not
receive the documents in Addendum 11 (the Huxtable sheets) or Addendum 12 (April
2001 Test Plan) until discovery in this matter. Thus, Heatsource cannot rely on
documents it never had at the relevant time. This issue is immaterial and does not create
a genuine issue of fact.
Furthermore, even if there was a purported deficiency or change in the
temperatures, such a change was not due to BJC, as Heatsource has admitted that BJC's
Spec, never changed. (R. 336). As any misunderstanding could not be attributed to BJC,
the trial court correctly found that "[t]o the extent Heatsource is claiming a defective or
deficient temperature specification, that is a claim that must be addressed, if at all, within
the express contractual framework." (R. 1447). That is, any purported deficiency was
due to a verbal statemient by DCS to Heatsource, not by BJC, and therefore, any recourse
must be on the subcontract between DCS and Heatsource.
In conclusion, because the work performed by Heatsource was within the scope of
an express contract and conducted pursuant to that express contract or subcontracts,
Heatsource cannot, as a matter of law, assert unjust enrichment or quantum meruit claims
against BJC—especially here, where, like American Towers, the other direct contracting
parties have no dispute with BJC.13 Moreover, Heatsource's only attempt to meet the

To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC
incorporates its arguments from the briefing below. (R. 891-92, 1400, 1404, 1420-21).
13

Despite Heatsource's statement that it fulfilled its subcontract with DCS, and for that
reason it did not file suit against DCS, the statement is conclusory and unsupported. In
fact, DCS has a stayed cross-claim for breach of contract and quantum meruit against
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second required element of an unjust enrichment claim (acknowledgment of a benefit)
fails because the evidence it exclusively relies upon to support that assertion is found in
Addendum 13, which, as discussed above, is not properly before this Court. Thus, the
trial court's entry of summary judgment was appropriate and should be upheld.14
IV,

THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT HEATSOURCE'S
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER
OF LAW SHOULD BE UPHELD
This Court should uphold the decision to dismiss Heatsource's breach of implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. Utah law generally implies a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in all contractual relationships. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-203
0997): St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991).
However, the covenant is only implied where there is an express contract between the
parties. See generally Christiansen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2005 UT 21, 116 P.3d 259.
Thus, if there is no direct contractual relationship between Heatsource and BJC, then the
claim fails as a matter of law. Here, Heatsource has not properly pled a direct contract or
an implied in fact contract, and more importantly, Heatsource has not appealed the
decision of the trial court finding that no such contracts exist. Consequently, as explained
Heatsource. (R. 246-49). Thus, Heatsource cannot unilaterally take the position it
completed its contract with DCS when the record shows that DCS has an opposite view.
14

It is worth noting that the trial court never waivered in its position that the existence of
a set of express subcontracts covering the subject matter of the purported implied in
law/unjust enrichment claims precluded such claims. That position is unassailable.
However, "out of an abundance of caution [the trial court] gave plaintiff leave to file a
Second Amended Complaint, which Complaint was specifically limited to any claim for
contract implied in fact." (R. 1442). The trial court correctly found on the second
summary judgment that the existence of the express subcontracts also barred an implied
in fact contract claim, i.e., also barred the second branch of quantum meruit claims.
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below, there is no claim for breach of contract or implied in fact contract properly before
the Court on appeal, and without either such claim, there is no contract within which an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could be imposed. As a result, the
decision of the trial court must be upheld.
A.

Heatsource Has Never Alleged a Cause of Action for Breach of Express
Contract and has Not Raised On Appeal Reversible Error Related to
any Purported Express Contract.

Heatsource never alleged the existence of an express (written or oral) contract with
BJC directly, and Heatsource never pled a breach of contract claim directly against BJC
in its Complaint or Second Amended Complaint. (R. 1-5, 914-920). Likewise,
Heatsource's Brief is devoid of any arguments suggesting that a direct, express contract
existed between Heatsource and BJC, and is also devoid of any claim that the trial court
erred with respect to any purported breach of express contract claim. Instead, Heatsource
has only claimed that the trial court erred in dismissing the Unjust Enrichment claim(s).
Thus, it must be accepted that no express contract existed between Heatsource and BJC.
The trial court correctly found that Heatsource "has not pled, and does not have, a
direct contract, either express or implied with BJC." (R. 911). BJC further demonstrated
that there was no meeting of the minds on a purported contract between Heatsource and
BJC direct, that BJC lacked any intent to enter into a direct contract, and also
demonstrated that an> purported contract lacked sufficiently definite terms to be
enforceable. (R. 1074-77). The undisputed facts further support the trial court's finding
since Heatsource's only direct contract was with DCS, Heatsource never made a direct
demand to BJC for payment (but instead, invoiced DMP for its work on the "second
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generation" heaters), and participated in a request for equitable adjustment to BJC
through DMP—the party that had a direct contract with BJC. (R. 335-37, 1067-69).15
As a result of these undisputed facts, the trial court found that "since no direct
contract has been properly alleged between BJC and Heatsource, there is no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing present between Heatsource and BJC." (R. 911).
The trial court was correct that without the existence of a direct contract between
Heatsource and BJC, no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can exist
between them and, therefore, the trial court's rulings in this regard must be sustained.
As with other rulings, Heatsource has failed to properly challenge the trial court's
ruling with respect to an express breach of contract claim. Heatsource makes no mention
of an express contract between itself and BJC in either its Docketing Statement or in its
Brief to this Court. As such, any potential challenge to this decision has been waived and
the Court need not consider it.16 Indeed, since Heatsource never even alleged a cause of
action for breach of an express contract, it should not now be allowed to assert it has such
an express contract with BJC.
B,

Heatsource Has Not Appealed the Trial Court's Rejection of an
Implied in Fact Contract Between Heatsource and BJC, and No Such
Contract Existed.

Similarly, the issue of whether an implied in fact contract existed between
Heatsource and BJC is not before this Court in this appeal. Points II and IV of

15

To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC
incorporates its briefing from below. (R. 1074-1080, 1416-1418).
16

See Brown, at Tj 23; Arviso, at f 4 n. 2.
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Heatsource's Brief both state the argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the
"Unjust Enrichment'" claim(s) of Heatsource. In those sections, however, Heatsource is
clear that it is merely appealing and arguing issues related to the dismissal of
Heatsource's implied in law/unjust enrichment claim(s) (the first branch of quantum
meruit claims)—and not appealing the grant of summary judgment in BJC's favor on any
purported implied in fact contract claim (the second branch of quantum meruit claims).
This is shown by Heatsource's citation of the applicable legal elements of the claim(s) it
is appealing: the sarnie standard for a contract implied in law (unjust enrichment) is set
forth in both sections entitled Points II and IV (compare pp. 25 and 30 of Heatsource's
Brief). Thus, both sections of Heatsource's Brief are directed at an alleged implied in
law/unjust enrichment claim, rather than an implied in fact contract claim.
In the trial court, the focus of Heatsource's Second Amended Complaint and the
second motion for summary judgment was on whether an implied in fact contract existed
directly between Heatsource and BJC. (R. 914-920, 1074-80, 1416-18). The trial court
correctly found that Heatsource had not presented sufficient evidence to create a material
dispute as to an implied in fact contract. (R. 1445). As an implied in fact contract has
entirely distinct requirements from those discussed by Heatsource on this appeal related
to implied in law/unjust enrichment claims, it must be determined that Heatsource has not
appealed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment on any purported implied
in fact contract. Heatsource's failure to raise such an argument and issue whatsoever in
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Heatsource's Brief or its Docketing Statement, effectively waives any appeal of the trial
i n

court's dismissal of Heatsource's claims on an implied in fact contract.
Even if the ruling had been appealed, it is entirely without merit because the trial
court correctly found that such a claim was deficient. Specifically, BJC established
through undisputed facts that no implied in fact contract existed between Heatsource and
BJC directly because there was no meeting of the minds, the essential terms for a contract
were lacking, and the parties never conducted themselves as if there was a direct contract
between Heatsource and BJC. The parties' conduct demonstrated that there was no direct
contract between Heatsource and BJC, and their actions are inconsistent with parties who
believed that they had a direct contract. (R. 1078-1080). In its summary judgment
briefing, BJC set forth 13 specific examples of conduct showing that BJC and Heatsource
did not act like there was a contract directly between them and importantly, Heatsource
did not even attempt to refute these examples. (Id.; 1418). Highlights of this evidence
include the fact that the work performed by Heatsource was already part of its obligation
under, and subject to, a series of contracts/subcontracts, Heatsource began working on the
"U-bent" heaters prior to even meeting BJC representatives, Heatsource never directly
asked BJC for payment, Heatsource invoiced DMP for its "additional" work, Heatsource
never told DMP that it had a direct contract with BJC, and Heatsource participated in the
request for equitable adjustment as a subcontractor of DMP. (R. 1078-79). The trial
court astutely noted that Heatsource's participation in the request for equitable
adjustment "is significant evidence that Heatsource never thought it had a contract." (R.
17

See Brown, at \ 23; Arviso, at \ 4 n. 2.
41

1447). This evidence shows that BJC and Heatsource never acted as if there was a
separate contract between them and this conduct, combined with the lack of mutual
assent and definite terms, substantiates the trial court's determination that no implied in
fact contract existed. (R. 1445-47).18
The end result of the failure to appeal the granting of summary judgment on the
implied in fact contract claim, as well as the trial court's correct ruling in this regard, is
that Heatsource cannot establish a contractual relationship with BJC into which an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be imposed. Without an underlying
contract directly between Heatsource and BJC, there can be no implied covenant between
the parties. Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to BJC on
the implied covenant claim.
C,

Even if a Contract Existed and a Covenant was Imposed, BJC has Not
Breached any such Covenant

The analysis of the Court can end with the recognition that no contractual
relationship existed between Heatsource and BJC into which an implied covenant can be
imposed. However, even if there were a contract between BJC and Heatsource such that
a covenant inhered between them, BJC demonstrated to the lower court that it had not
breached any such covenant as a matter of law. Under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, each party promises not to "' intentionally or purposely do anything which will
destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of a contract.'" Malibu Inv.
Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30, t 19, 996 P.2d 1043 (quoting St. Benedict's, 811 P.2d at
18

To the extent the Court wishes to review a more detailed argument on this issue, BJC
incorporates its arguments from the briefing below. (R. 1074-1080, 1416-1418).
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199). Significantly, however, a party cannot be found liable for breaching the implied
covenant when it acts in conformity with the underlying express contract. Five F, LLC v.
Heritage Savings Bank, 2003 UT App 373, ^ 23, 81 P.3d 105. In other words, if the
purportedly breaching conduct is permitted by law or by the underlying express contract,
then there can be no valid breach of an implied covenant. Id.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that BJC acted properly. The most critical fact
here is that BJC's Spec, for the heat probe system never changed during the entire
process. (R. 336, 1068). As such, BJC simply expected full performance under its
contract with DMP: that is, the production of a complete heat probe system that met the
specifications. (R. 333-34, 337, 1066-67, 1069). Moreover, prior to the request for
equitable adjustment, Heatsource never said that it would require extra compensation,
that its work would cost more, or that it would bill on a time and materials basis for its
work. (R. 336-37, 1068-69). Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that BJC paid
$716,798 to DMP on the Contract, from which DMP then paid its subcontractors,
including Heatsource. (R. 337, 1069). Such payment demonstrates good faith. In
addition, when Heatsource and DCS, through DMP, sought an equitable adjustment to
the contract price, the evidence below showed that BJC properly, and in good faith,
considered the request, and that DMP believes BJC acted properly. (R. 338, 1079-70).
Under these facts, it is clear that BJC acted in good faith, did nothing to prevent
Heatsource from gaining the benefits under its contract with DCS, and did not breach any
purportedly implied covenant. Based on this evidence, the trial court correctly found that
Heatsource "has not identified any actions on the part of BJC that could even potentially
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violate an implied covenant.... Indeed, the undisputed facts which have not been
controverted by Heatsource show that BJC has not acted in bad faith with respect to any
potential implied covenant claim." (R. 911). Summary judgment was therefore properly
granted below.
CONCLUSION
The trial court acted entirely within its discretion and ruled correctly in every
regard while granting summary judgment in favor of BJC and against Heatsource. On
this appeal, Heatsource has entirely failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the trial
court that would merit reversal of the orders at issue. Furthermore, the undisputed facts
supported the trial court's decisions to grant summary judgment to BJC on all of
Heatsource's claims. Simply put, Heatsource has not raised one argument or fact that
demonstrates any error on the part of the trial court. Consequently, BJC respectfully
requests that this Court uphold the rulings of the trial court and reject the present appeal
of Heatsource.
Dated: April 4, 2008

Holland & Hart LLP

BYym K. Benard
Jennifer L. Lange
Attorneys for Appellee
Bechtel Jacobs Company
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Addendum A:
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Addendum B:

Ruling and Order granting second motion for summary judgment of
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Brent Johnson, 7558
Bryan K. Benard, 9023
HOLLAND & HART LLP
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031

c.

^

Attorneys for Defendant
Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
E & M SALES WEST INC., dba
HEATSOURCE, a corporation,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil Action No. 020901874

BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,

Judge: Robert K. Hilder

Defendant.

BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.

DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS,
INC., an Idaho corporation, and
DIVERSIFIED CONTROL SYSTEMS,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
Third-Party Defendants,
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS

The motion for summary judgment by Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Bechtel
Jacobs Company LLC ("BJC") came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Robert K.
Hilder on the 21st day of November, 2005, at 3:00 p.m. Plaintiff E & M Sales West Inc. dba
Heatsource ("Heatsource") appeared through its counsel of record, Edward M. Garrett of Garrett
& Garrett. Defendant and Third-party Defendants Diversified Metal Products ("DMP") and
Diversified Control Systems ("DCS") appeared through their counsel of record, Kevin D.
Swenson of Suitter Axland. BJC specially appeared by its counsel of record, Bryan K. Benard of
Holland & Hart LLP.
The Court having read and considered the moving papers and evidence in support of
BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the opposing papers, evidence and affidavit of
Heatsource, and the reply memoranda and evidence submitted by BJC, and furthermore, having
conducted oral argument related to the same, and being now fully advised,
HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS:
1.

Based on Heatsource's failure to comply with the requirements of Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure Rule 7, as well as Heatsource's failure to controvert the evidence submitted by
BJC to support its undisputed material facts, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and accepts as undisputed, the material facts set forth by BJC in its moving papers.
2.

BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted with respect to Heatsource's first

and third causes of action in the Amended Complaint for Quantum Meruit and Unjust
Enrichment respectively. The Court finds that these claims are identical and are equitable in
nature, such that they may only be brought in the absence of an express contract over the subject
matter of the underlying work performed. The Court finds that the undisputed facts demonstrate
1

that BJC contracted with DMP for the production of a probe system, a part of which included the
creation of certain five-zone heaters. DMP then subcontracted the production of the five-zone
heaters to DCS. In turn, DCS then subcontracted the specific production of the five-zone heaters
to Heatsource. Consequently, the Court finds that the work performed by Heatsource related to
the production of the five-zone heaters was subject to, and within the scope of, the express
contracts and subcontracts involved. Since the production of the five-zone heater forms the basis
of Heatsource's first and third causes of action for Quantum Meruit and Unjust Enrichment, but
also is entirely covered by, and within the scope of, the express contracts and subcontracts
between BJC, DMP, DCS and Heatsource, as a matter of law, Heatsource's first and third causes
of action fail. Heatsource's first and third causes of action are therefore dismissed with
prejudice.
3.

BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Heatsource's fourth cause

of action in the Amended Complaint for fraud. The Court finds that the undisputed facts
demonstrate that Heatsource cannot establish the requisite elements of a claim for fraud.
Specifically, the Court finds that the undisputed facts show that Heatsource cannot demonstrate
that any BJC representative made a false statement or misrepresentation concerning a presently
existing fact or that any BJC representative knew such statement or representation was false. In
addition, the Court finds that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Heatsource cannot show the
required detrimental reliance on any purported statement or representation made by a BJC
representative. Accordingly, since Heatsource cannot establish the requisite elements of a fraud
claim, and has not created a genuine issue of material fact or otherwise controverted the evidence

2

& in

submitted by BJC as undisputed, BJC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Heatsource's fourth cause of action is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
4.

BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Heatsource's second cause

of action in the Amended Complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The Court finds that the pleadings before the Court as well as the undisputed facts
presented by BJC, establish that Heatsource has not pled, and does not have, a direct contract,
either express or implied with BJC. Consequently, since no direct contract has been properly
alleged between BJC and Heatsource, there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
present between Heatsource and BJC. Moreover, Heatsource has not identified any actions on
the part of BJC that could even potentially violate an implied covenant, even if one existed
between the parties. Indeed, the undisputed facts which have not been controverted by
Heatsource show that BJC has not acted in bad faith with respect to any potential implied
covenant claim. Consequently, BJC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the second
cause of action. Heatsource's second cause of action is therefore dismissed without prejudice, as
a limited opportunity exists for Heatsource to perhaps plead a claim for breach of the implied
covenant as discussed below.
5.

The Court grants limited leave to Heatsource to file a Second Amended

Complaint to assert a direct contract implied in fact claim against BJC. The Court further grants
leave to Heatsource to plead an implied covenant claim related to such implied in fact contract
claim, if the covenant claim asserts a breach of the covenant beyond alleged nonpayment under
the purported implied in fact contract and that is directly related to the alleged express promises
made. The Court does not grant leave to allege any other claims. Heatsource is to file the
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Second Amended Complaint within 20 days from the hearing on the Motion for Summary
Judgment which was held on November 21, 2005.

>*

Dated: 7\

_,2005.

BYT,

6rt K. H i l d e r ^ ^ t t
District Court Judge

^£*<u v

h
V/

Approved as to form:

Edward M. Garrett
Garrett & Garrett
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI J^Juc^o.a/Disfrfcf

HW 2 S 2006

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

^ L T U K £ UOUNTY

E & M SALES WEST INC., dba
HEATSOURCE, a corporation,

RULING AND ORDER
CASE NO.

020901874

Plaintiff,
vs .
Judge Robert K. Hilder
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Defendant.
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.
DIVERSIFIED METAL PRODUCTS, INC.,
an Idaho corporation, and
DIVERSIFIED CONTROL SYSTEMS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Third Party Defendants
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS

Defendant Bechtel Jacobs' ( U BJC") second Motion for Summary Judgment
was argued to the Court on November 27, 2006.

Edward M. Garrett appeared

for plaintiff, Bryan K. Benard and Jennifer L. Lange appeared for BJC,
and Kevin Swenson, counsel for the Diversified parties, was also present,
but did not argue.

Following argument, the Court took the matter under

advisement.
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Issue for Decision

Whether plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed,
as a matter of law
II. History of Proceedings
This matter has been pending before the Court for about four years,
and has had a fairly convoluted history

Confining this discussion to

the controversy between plaintiff (vvHeatsource") and BJC, the following
history is important to an understanding of the Court's Ruling at this
time
The

case arises

originating m

from

a series

m

Diversified Metal Products, which m
Systems, the general

and

subcontracts,

turn entered

Tennessee

BJC contracted with

turn contracted with Diversified

subject matter of which contracts was

production of a heater probe system
m

contracts

B J C s agreement with the federal government to complete

an environmental cleanup project

Control

of

Diversified Control Systems (UDCS")

into a contract with Heatsource, memorialized by a

purchase order, for production of a five-zone heater that would be a part
of the heater probe system
After discovery

m

this matter, BJC's first Motion for Summary

Judgment was heard by the Court on November 21, 2005, and m

an Order

/ i / *1

E St M SALES WEST V.
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY
entered
meruit

December 8, 2005,
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(quantum

the Court dismissed Counts 1 and 3

and unjust enrichment) , along with a fraud claim, which is not at

issue m

any way m

the present Motion

unjust enrichment/quantum meruit

In addition to dismissing the

claims (which BJC argued and the Court

agreed amounted to the same claim) , m

an abundance of caution this Court

gave plaintiff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which Complaint
was specifically limited to any claim for contract implied m

fact, and

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
I suggest that the Order allowing amendment was an abundance of
caution, because BJC had argued persuasively that plaintiff may not
assert

equitable

claims

enrichment/quantum meruit,

under

the

general

rubric

of

unjust

if the subject matter of the claim is covered

by a contract or set of contracts

As part of this Court's ruling of

December 8, 2005, I found that contracts did, m

fact, exist covering the

subject matter of plaintiff's claims against BJC.
Nevertheless, I allowed the amendment m

the event plaintiff could

show that BJC had, through its conduct, entered into a separate and
distinct contract with plaintiff for additional or separate work related
to production of the heater.
As a necessary part of my earlier ruling, I accepted BJC's position

E & M SALES WEST V
BECHTEL JACOBS COMPANY
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that plaintiff had utterly failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), Utah
Rules

of

Civil

Procedure,

insofar

as plaintiff

did

not

specifically

identify and restate BJC's statement of undisputed facts, and even where
plaintiff

claimed

factual disputes, m

virtually every

instance those

statements were not supported by citations to the record

In addition,

plaintiff relied heavily on an Affidavit of Andrew Nelson

BJC properly

asked the Court to disregard that Affidavit, because it came subsequent
to Mr

Nelson's voluminous deposition, and it was inconsistent with or

contradicted deposition testimony

I am not sure that I expressly ruled

that the Affidavit should be stricken, but it was inherent in my prior
ruling that plaintiff had failed to adequately rebut at least the first
28 claimed undisputed facts asserted by BJC and at this time I make clear
that the Nelson Aifidavit submitted in 2005 should be stricken
III.

Discussion

The gravamen of plaintiff's present claim is that BJC requested work
from Heatsource trat was more than originally contemplated, and that the
work Heatsource did, and for which it was apparently compensated,
defective,

if

at

all,

because

BJC

changed

specifically, BJC required a tolerance to 800°
Celsius, which was

indisputably

the

was

specifications,

Celsius, rather than 650°

a number provided by DCS verbally

to

// f / l -^
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Heatsource
The critical issue for the Court at this time is whether plaintiff
has

identified

any admissible

evidence

that

would

controvert

BJC's

position that a contract implied in fact was never created by the conduct
of these two parties

A significant portion of the argument on November

27, 2006, was spent distinguishing contract implied m
implied m

fact

law from contract

As the fairly plentiful case law on the topic makes

clear, this is a distinction which is not always analyzed as precisely
See,

as it should be

In fact, plaintiff's

Davies

v. Olson,

claims

I and III m

746 P 2d 264, (Utah App

its prior version of the

Complaint essentially alleged contract implied m
unjust

enrichment

quantum

and

1987)

meruit

law under the two names

They

were,

accordingly,

duplicative, but they were dismissed primarily because the Court found
that a contract (indeed, a network of contracts) existed and recourse to
a contract implied in law, which is not really a contract at all, but
merely an equitable means to prevent unjust enrichment
Contract

implied

contract implied m

m

law

fact

is clearly a different creature from

As the Utah Court of Appeals noted m

contracts implied m

fact are

"no different

although different m

mode of expressing assent "

Davies,

than express contracts,
Id

at 269 (citing,

i/i/i/i
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§ 18 (1963))

The elements of a contract

(1) the defendant requested the plaintiff to perform

work, (2) the p l a m t i f f expected the defendant to compensate him or her
for those services, and (3) the defendant knew or should have known that
See, Id

the plaintiff expected compensation
Pines

Homeowneis,
Based

, and P A D D

789 P 2d 52, 57 (Utah App

on

the

foregoing

faced

with

v

Graystone

for

Summary

1990)
BJC's

Motion

Judgment, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to presert evidence of each of
the foregoing elements
First,

plaintiff

is

I must conclude that plaintiff has not done so
fairly

limited

m

its

options,

having

already

admitted, by failure to properly controvert, numerous facts that go to
the

heart

of

the

issue

Even

if,

however,

plaintiff

had

controverted the 1 acts previously alleged by BJC, plaintiff
a

very

sparse

plaintiff's

own

reviewed again

factual

landscape

to

support

facts,

including

deposition

its

properly
identifies

claim

testimony

That
that

(Andrew Nelson), makes it clear that Heatsource

working on an alternative heater m
even met directly with BJC

I

is,
have

started

May and June of 2001, before they had

and certainly before even Heatsource claims

that any promises were made
The critical meeting at which BJC claims words and conduct evinced

E & M SALES WEST V
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on

June

27,

2001,

m

Idaho

Plaintiff's best case argument is that it had representatives present at
a meeting, which was
entities

also attended by BJC and

the

two Diversified

A significant topic was the failure of the heater to function

at a required temperature

Plaintiff claims that statements by BJC

representatives, including something to the effect that if a product is
produced and functioned as required, BJC would back up the money truck
While BJC denies that the comment was ever made, that denial would merely
set up a dispute, but not one that is material to my determination of any
issue before the court
To summarize, based on already admitted facts, the work performed
by Heatsource was part of its obligations under its subcontract with DCS
Heatsource

admitted

that

the work

it was required

to do under its

subcontract with DCS equally describes work for uU-bent" heaters and non
U-bent

heaters, which

is one of

the distinctions

now being urged

Heatsource never claimed that it was billing on a time and material basis
until it submitted a request for equitable adjustment, which was not done
until weeks after the work was done

In other words, Heatsource has

essentially admitted that there was no discussion of time and materials
payment on June 27, 2001, and its admission of a request for equitable

\U(1(
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contract

implied

m

fact.

On

the

contrary, it is significant evidence that Heatsource never thought it had
a contract and was merely seeking an additional payment to which it was
not otherwise entLtled
or deficient

To the extent Heatsource is claiming a defective

temperature

specification,

that is a claim

that must be
United

addressed, if at all, within the express contractual framework
States

v.

Spearir,

LEXIS 1700

248 U.S. 132, 39 S.Ct. 59, 63 L.Ed

166, 1918 U S

(1918).

After carefully reconsidering all of the applicable case law, I am
persuaded that both contract implied m
theories
subject

are baried
matter.

if enforceable

(See cases cited

law and contract implied m

contracts
m

exist

BJC's o p e n m g

cases address both branches of quasi contract.

covering

an example addressing contract implied in fact).

the same

memorandum,

P.A.D.D.

fact

which

789 P 2d 52, is

Accordingly, for this

reason alone BJC's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
addition,

even

if a contract

implied

m

fact may be

considered

In
m

a

circumstance where a contract or set of contracts exists; for example,
if the subject matter of the contract
separate from the work at issue m

implied m

fact is

sufficiently

the enforceable contracts, I find no

evidence creating a genuine and material dispute that such was the case
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in the present matter
Referring specifically to the elements of a contract implied
fact

I do not

find any evidence

plaintiff to perform the work

that

the defendant

m

requested the

It is reasonable to determine from the

evidence that, at some point, Heatsource desired BJC to compensate for
the work that it considered to be additional, but the evidence does not
support that Heatsource had any such expectation at the time of its sole
conversation with BJC (June 27, 2001) and the evidence does not support
that the final element existed, namely, that BJC knew or should have
known

that

Heatsource

appropriately m

expected

compensation

The

only

evidence

the record supports BJC's position that it expected

performance from Heatsource and all other contractors and subcontractors
under its fixed price contract
For the foregoing reasons, B J C s Motion for Summary Judgment be and
hereby is granted, and plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint against BJC
is dismissed

No further Order is required

Dated this-^/"~ day of November, 2006
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby

certify

that

I mailed

a true

and

correct

foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this ^i

copy

of

the

day of November,

2006 :

Edward M Garrett
Attorney for Plaintiff
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Brent Johnson
Bryan K. Benard
Jennifer L. Lange
Attorneys for Defendant Bechtel Jacobs
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Kevin D Swenson
Attorney for Deferdant Diversified
8 E Broadway, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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